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Abstract 
In this paper, we generalize Kato's (Economics Bulletin, 2008) model by allowing many private firms in the mixed 
oligopoly setting, rather than the mixed duopoly framework of Kato (2008). By introducing the government's 
preference for tax revenues into the theoretical framework of mixed oligopoly, we show that Kato's results are robust 
when there are many private firms. That is, as the number of private firms increases, both total output and the 
government's payoff in the mixed oligopoly are larger than those in the private oligopoly if and only the weight of the 
government's preferences on tax revenues increases and vice versa.
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     1 Introduction
Within the literature of mixed oligopoly, a strand examines government subsidies designed
to limit the reduction in quantity. For example, White (1996), Poyago-Theotoky (2001),
and Myles (2002) showed that optimal subsidy, prots and social welfare are identical
before and after the privatization of a public rm in a mixed oligopoly. That is, irrespective
of whether a public rm moves simultaneously with private rms, the public rm acts as a
Stackelberg leader, or all rms behave as prot maximizers. On the other hand, Fjell and
Heywood (2004) demonstrated that when the public leader is privatized and becomes the
private leader, the optimal subsidy, output, and social welfare are all reduced. Moreover,
by introducing taxes (ad valorem or specic) into a mixed oligopoly, Mujumdar and Pal
(1998) showed that privatization could increase both social welfare and tax revenues,
where an increase in tax does not change the total output but increases the output of
the public rm and the tax revenue. In all the abovementioned studies that consider
both subsidies and taxation in a mixed oligopoly market, the public rm as well as the
government maximize social welfare, which is dened as the sum of the tax revenue or
subsidy, consumers' and producers' surplus.
Although some theoretical studies have been successful in explaining mixed oligopolies,
Matusumura (1998), Saha and Sensarma (2008) and Kato (2008) have explicitly investi-
gated the dierent objective functions existing between a public rm and the government
in mixed duopolies. Contrary to previous ndings that of the dierent objective func-
tions existing between the government and a public rm in a mixed duopoly is relatively
new because, up until the present, the literatures on the objective functions between the
government and a public rm have found various robust results in a mixed oligopoly. In
this sense, Matusumura (1998), Saha and Sensarma (2008) and Kato (2008) have made
a signicant contribution to the literature. Contrary to the results of previous stud-
ies (Poyago-Theotoky (2001), Fjell and Heywood (2004), Mujumdar and Pal (1998) and
Myles (2002)), if a public rm takes full account of consumer and producer surplus, while
the government attaches greater priority to both its social welfare and preference for tax
revenues, Kato (2008) showed that a government's readiness to privatize a public rm
would depend on its preference for raising greater tax revenues.
To study the eects that arise when the objective functions of the government and a
public rm are dierent, we generalize Kato's (2008) model by allowing n private rms
in the mixed oligopoly setting, rather than the mixed duopoly framework used in Kato
(2008). In this paper, we show that Kato's (2008) results are robust when there are more
private rms. Hence, our result is a generalization of the result of Kato (2008), which
investigated the government preference for tax revenue when there is only one private
rm. Here, according to our results derived from general formulation, we nd that as
the number of private rms increase, both total output and the government's payo in a
mixed oligopoly are larger than those in the privatized oligopoly if and only if the weight
of the government's preference for tax revenues would increase and vice versa.
12 The Model
Consider a mixed oligopoly situation for a homogeneous good that is supplied by one
public rm and n private rms. Firm i (i = 1;:::;n) is a prot-maximizing private rm
and rm 0 is a public rm that maximizes social welfare. Assume that the inverse demand
is characterized by




where x0 is the output level of the public rm and xi is the output level of the private
rm i.




2 , each rm's prot is as following function




  txj; j = 0;1;:::;n; (1)
where t is the specic tax. On the other hand, the public rm's objective is to maximize
welfare, which is dened as the sum of the consumer surplus, the prots of individual
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where X is the total output and T = t(x0 +
Pn
i=1 xi) is tax revenue.
In the manner of Kato (2008), we also assume that the government's payo is given by
G = W+(1+a)T, where a is the parameter that represents the weight of the government's
preference for tax revenues. Here a  0, i.e., the government values tax revenues T more
than social welfare W.
Finally, a two-stage game is conducted. The timing of the game is as follows. In
the rst stage, the government sets the specic tax. In the second stage, each rm
simultaneously chooses its quantity xj to maximize its respective object knowing specic
tax of the government.
2.1 The Mixed Oligopoly
Given tax t in the second stage, by the rst-order condition to maximize (1) and (2), we
obtain,
x0 =
1   t   nxi
2
; xi =
1   t   x0
n + 2
: (3)








2We now move to the rst stage of the game. From (4), the government's payo, Gm,




(1   t)2(8 + 7n + n2) + 2t(1   t)(1 + a)(4 + n)(2 + n)
2(4 + n)2 :
Straightforward computation yields the optimal tax rate as follows:
t
m =
a(4 + n)(2 + n)   n
2a(4 + n)(2 + n) + 8 + 5n + n2: (5)




2(1 + a)(2 + n)
2a(4 + n)(2 + n) + 8 + 5n + n2; x
m
i =
(1 + a)(2 + n)
2a(4 + n)(2 + n) + 8 + 5n + n2: (6)
Using (6) and noting that Gm = W m + (1 + a)T m, we can compute the government's
payo Gm as follows:
G
m =
(1 + a)2(2 + n)2
2[2a(4 + n)(2 + n) + 8 + 5n + n2]
: (7)
2.2 The Privatized Oligopoly
Consider the case of a privatized oligopoly where the public rm is privatized without
cost.
Given tax t in the second stage, the rst-order condition to maximize (1) is
xi =




when there are n + 1 private rms. Symmetry across private rms implies that each





Turning to the rst stage and using the equilibrium output, the government's payo




(1 + n)(1   t)[(n + 4)(1   t) + 2t(1 + a)(3 + n)]
2(3 + n)2 :
Straightforward computation yields optimal tax rate in the privatized oligopoly as follows:
t
p =
n + 4   (1 + a)(3 + n)
n + 4   2(1 + a)(3 + n)
: (9)





n + 4   2(1 + a)(3 + n)
: (10)
Similar to previous subsection, using (10) and noting that Gp = W p + (1 + a)T p, we can
compute the government's payo Gp as follows:
G
p =
 (1 + a)2(1 + n)
2[n + 4   2(1 + a)(3 + n)]
: (11)
33 Comparisons




(1 + a)(8 + 3n)
F(a)
(12)
where F(a)  a2(96+104n+36n2+4n3)+a(80+86n+32n2+4n3)+16+18n+7n2+n3:
Note that F(a) > 0 for all a  0, F(0) > 0 and F 0(0) > 0 since it is a second-order
polynomial of a. Hence, we can obtain
t
m   t
p > 0 when n  1:











(1 + a)2[8a   n(1   4a)]
4F(a)
(14)
for which the signs change according to the numerator of (13) and (14) since each denom-




the numerator of (13) and (14) always has positive values; otherwise, it always has negative
values. Hence, the sign of (13) and (14) always becomes
G
m   G
p > 0 and X
m   X




This means that when the number of private rms increases, both total output and the
government's payo in the mixed oligopoly are larger than those in the privatized oligopoly
if and only if the weight of the government's preference for tax revenues increases and
vice versa. As a result, having derived the equilibrium values for taxes, total outputs, and
government preference, we can state the following:
Proposition 1: Suppose that there exits the government's preference for tax revenues.
Then, as the number of private rms increases, both total output and the government's
payo in the mixed oligopoly are larger than those in the privatized oligopoly if and only
if the weight of the government's preference for tax revenues increases and vice versa.
This proposition suggests that when both total output and the government's payo in
the mixed oligopoly are larger than those in the privatized oligopoly, the number of
private rms is proportional to the government's preference for tax revenues, which is
simultaneously determined by the equilibrium values.
In sum, except for the dierence in the optimal tax rates, the dierence in a gov-
ernment's payos and total outputs depends on both the number of private rms and
4a government's preference for tax revenues. Furthermore, we show that even though a
government suciently prefers tax revenue, it does have an incentive to privatize a public
rm when the number of private rms is suciently small. This result is dierent from
that of DeFraja and Delbono (1989), who found that the privatization of the public rm is
desirable in terms of social welfare when the number of existing private rms is large. Fi-
nally, Kato (2008) showed that both total output and the government's payo in a mixed
duopoly are larger than those in a privatized duopoly if the government's preference is
suciently large. In contrast, our paper demonstrates that even though the government's
preference for tax revenues is suciently large, both total output and the government's
payo in the mixed oligopoly are smaller than those in the privatized oligopoly if the
number of existing rms is suciently small.
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